HUMAN SUPERVISION AS A CONDITION FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS MEDIATED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Abstract

The incorporation of artificial intelligence systems into the Judiciary has been driven by the pursuit of greater efficiency and speed in the delivery of justice, especially in contexts of high litigation and institutional overload. However, the use of these technologies introduces significant tensions at the legal-constitutional level, insofar as it influences significant stages of the decision-making process without formally replacing the judge. This article aims to analyze to what extent the use of artificial intelligence in the Judiciary can be reconciled with fundamental rights and the democratic legitimacy of judicial decisions. A qualitative, theoretical-dogmatic approach is adopted, based on the analysis of constitutional and procedural doctrine and critical literature on algorithms. Initially, the impact of artificial intelligence on the judicial decision-making environment is examined, highlighting the notion of implicit delegation of the power to judge. Then, the relationship between efficiency, access to justice, and the limits of technology is analyzed, highlighting the insufficiency of purely quantitative metrics. Finally, it is argued that meaningful human oversight constitutes a requirement for the constitutional legitimacy of judicial decisions mediated by artificial intelligence, insofar as it ensures justification, contestability, and accountability. It is concluded that technological efficiency cannot be treated as an autonomous value, but must be subordinated to the effectiveness of the judiciary and the protection of fundamental rights.